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	There is perhaps no area of ethical thinking that pushes us to examine the foundations of ethical thought more than environmental ethics.  Should we think of the ethical demands placed upon our behavior in terms of the maximization of pleasure over pain?  If so, should it be human pleasure and pain or the pleasure and pain of all sentient beings?  Should we think of those demands in terms of the maximization of human happiness or of some other notion of human well-being?  Should we think of those demands in terms of the promotion of certain types of virtue?  Should we think of those demands in terms of rules governing some sort of moral community, perhaps a Kantian “kingdom of ends” or a Jamesian “Ethical Republic?”  The practical question, of course, is how we are to live our lives.  In particular, how are we to conduct ourselves when what is involved is our behavior as it affects the environment in which we and our children, grandchildren, and descendants well into the future?  The philosophical question is what kind of analytical framework can be help us to think more clearly about how we are to live.
	To address the philosophical question adequately it is important to keep clear focus on the range of practical problems that arise in our interaction with our environment.  Suppose that we adopt an ethical framework according to which we judge our behavior on the balance of pleasure over pain that we produce.  As Peter Singer has rightly noted in a large body of work, if pleasure and pain are the key moral criteria, it seems arbitrary to privilege human pleasure and pain over pleasure and pain in other forms of sentient life.  At the same time, if we adopt a principle of determining our behavior so as to promote pleasure over pain in whatever forms of sentient life they may arise, we find some seriously counter-intuitive consequences.  Suppose that we find ourselves in the wilderness needing food, confronted with a choice of killing a common white-tailed deer or an endangered caribou.  If our ethical principle is simply promoting the highest level of pleasure over pain it would seem that we could equally well kill the deer or the caribou.  Either would likely experience roughly the same level of pain in its death.  We find ourselves with an ethical principle that has no place for consideration of species membership.  Such an ethical approach is unable to support the broadly shared view that preservation of species is a good.
	A number of philosophers have attempted to frame environmental ethics in terms of the alleged intrinsic goodness of various natural objects.  Quite apart from the inadequacy of most of the popular arguments for the position, it also fails to provide an analytic framework for addressing species problems.  Perhaps worse yet, it would fail to provide any principled distinction between caribou and broccoli.  This would seem to be the case with any approach that takes individual entities in the environment, whether human individuals or individuals of other sorts, as the starting point of ethical analysis without understanding those individuals as, in some sense, parts of a larger whole.
	These considerations lead me to the view that the pressing ethical problems that arise in our interaction with the environment in which we live provide important support for understanding ethical agents centrally as parts of some sort of community of interrelated parts.  For reasons that will become clear over the course of this paper, the kind of community in terms of which ethical life should be framed is best rooted in William James’s “Ethical Republic” rather than Immanuel Kant’s “Kingdom of Ends.”
In current thinking about the environment, sustainability has become a very fashionable topic of conversation.  We are, for example, presently in the middle of what UNESCO has declared as the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development.  I suspect that this declaration has generated responses in virtually every UN member nation.  Among the many organizational responses in the United States has been the Disciplinary Associations Network for Sustainability, group of which the American Philosophical Association is a member.  The APA has affiliated itself with the Network because we philosophers are surely among those whose discipline has an important contribution to make to the great discussions on how human beings can live together on this planet in ways that will facilitate not only our own well-being, but also the well-being of our descendants into the distant future.
	While sustainability is in many respects a rather recent public concern, philosophers have for over two thousand years been concerned with the question of how human communities can be structured and can function in ways that will facilitate human well-being that will be sustainable from generation to generation.  From Plato and Aristotle to thinkers of the present day, writers on social and political philosophy have been concerned with conditions that tend to undermine societies’ capacity to endure from generation to generation.  The central difference between this long-standing concern for sustainable communities and the contemporary interest in sustainability is that earlier discussions focused on the sustainability of the social and economic environments in which people lived, while contemporary discussion expands to include the physical environment in which people live as well.  
The basic premise for most discussion of sustainability is that the capacity for growth in any system is not unlimited.  Aristotle famously argues that the state will be most sustainable if it is not too large, either in population or territory (Politics, VII, 4-5).  The historical record is clear that our particular judgments at any given time about the limits on growth are regularly mistaken.  However the claim that the capacity for growth is greater than we might be able to foresee is clearly far removed from the claim that the capacity for growth is unlimited.  John Stuart Mill’s discussion of “The Stationary State,” in his Principles of Political Economy, is particularly apt on this point as it relates to economic growth.
It must always have been seen, more or less distinctly, by political economists, that the increase of wealth is not boundless: that at the end of what they term the progressive state lies the stationary state, that all progress in wealth is but a postponement of this, and that each step in advance is an approach to it. We have now been led to recognize that this ultimate goal is at all times near enough to be fully in view; that we are always on the verge of it, and that if we have not reached it long ago, it is because the goal itself flies before us. The richest and most prosperous countries would very soon attain the stationary state, if no further improvements were made in the productive arts, and if there were a suspension of the overflow of capital from those countries into the uncultivated or ill-cultivated regions of the earth. (334)
Mill makes two central and correct points here.  First, he notes that the limits of growth do expand with increases in technological development, although not unlimitedly so.  Second, he notes that the growth of the richest countries expands as they use their capital to exploit the resources of less economically advanced regions of the earth.  Mill also takes the position, almost alone among the great political economists of his time, that the stationary state, the condition in which the quest for growth has essentially come to an end, is a more desirable human condition than that in which growth dominates human aspiration.
I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable improvement on our present condition. I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of human kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of industrial progress. (336)
Mill’s point is that the quest for perpetual growth brings with it a certain social instability, the “trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading” that pits class against class and person against person.  That social instability does not promote a sustainable human well-being.
As I noted above, present-day talk about sustainability is concerned not only with the sustainability of the social or economic environment, but also with the sustainability of the entire environment, including the physical environment.  We have learned from Mill’s contemporary, Charles Darwin, that humans are an interactive part of an embracing physical environment, just as all other living creatures are interactive parts of an embracing physical environment.  Just as other species of living creatures can adapt to or fail to adapt to their environments, so humans can adapt to or fail to adapt to their physical environment.  As Mill notes with respect to our social and economic environment, we have very substantial capacity to adapt through “improvements … in the productive arts,” but in the end we too are subject to the inexorable demands placed on us by our total environment.
One of the pioneers in developing the study of ecology in the United States was Aldo Leopold, a forester by training.  In a very brief section of Leopold’s iconic A Sand County Almanac, Leopold advocates what he called a “Land Ethic.”  While the land ethic is not developed in any detail in Leopold’s work, it rests on two foundations that provide material for the development of a philosophical foundation for sustainability.  First, Leopold claims that ethics “has its origin in the tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to evolve modes of co-operation” (202).  While this is largely simple assertion on Leopold’s part, the claim that ethics involve the evolution of modes of social cooperation presents an understanding of ethics that seems very much akin to the ethical views of pragmatists like William James.  James’ ethics replaces Kant’s “kingdom of ends” with an “ethical republic” in which humans negotiate their needs and demands in a set of ever-developing equilibria.​[1]​  On this basis Leopold puts forward the basic claim that “All ethics so far evolved rests upon a single premise: that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts” (203), a claim that echoes James’ view that ethical terms only acquire any meaning in the context of a “moral universe,” a context in which humans interact in ways that place mutual and sometimes conflicting demands upon one another (MP, 148-150).  For the purposes of this paper, I will simply accept Leopold’s first foundational claim, understood in roughly the manner in which I have elaborated James’ ethical views elsewhere.
Leopold’s second foundational claim moves squarely in the direction of grounding a contemporary understanding of sustainability.  The “community of interdependent parts” that constitutes Leopold’s community of moral concern is not simply a community of human agents.  Rather it is a community that “include[s] soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land” (204).  Leopold’s extension of the moral community is, at one level, obviously correct.  At the same time, it is, at another level, profoundly problematic.
The level at which Leopold’s extension of the moral community is obviously correct, lies in a recognition that is borne out by the knowledge of evolutionary biology that we have gained since the work of Darwin.  We humans clearly are parts of a system of “interdependent parts” that includes that includes “soils, water, plants, and animals.”  The basic biological mechanism of natural selection is a process of species developing in response to the various factors that their environments present.  Thus species develop in response to the availability of various forms of nourishment, the variety of predators that threaten to eat them before they are able to reproduce, competition with other species that require the same sources of nutrition, characteristics that affect mate selection, etc.  In short, the various parts of an ecological system are interdependent in a multitude of ways that leaves each part dependent upon all the others.
The level at which Leopold’s extension is problematic, lies in how this collection of interdependent parts can constitute a “community.”  The problem becomes clear if we focus on the contrast between Kant’s idea of a “kingdom of ends” and James’s idea of an “ethical republic.”  Kant’s “kingdom of ends” is a “systematic union of different rational beings under common laws” (100).  Kant thinks that, to the extent that we are all rational, we will agree about the content of that “common law.”  James, correctly and by contrast, recognizes the frequent “falsity of our judgments, so far as they presume to decide in an absolute way on the value of other persons’ conditions or ideals” (CB, 132).  The necessary response to the “falsity,” on James’s view, is that the Kingdom of Ends must be replaced by an Ethical Republic in which the various members of the community are able to debate and challenge one another, working out a system of morality as an equilibrium in which both their consonant and competing demands may be most fully met.  Central to the Ethical Republic is the ability of human agents to communicate with one another, to voice their various concerns and demands in a public forum.  Accordingly, just as the Ethical Republic does not generate unanimous agreement, so it also does not generate eternal agreement either.  The social equilibrium developed in the Ethical Republic must be an ever-emerging equilibrium.  This must be so because of the fact that, for each of us, our knowledge of the concrete needs and concerns of the other members of our community is never perfect and final.  Moreover, it must also be so because of the fact that we will encounter different people over time, with different needs and concerns – people, needs and concerns of which we may well have been unaware at earlier points in time.  The social equilibrium should always, however, be improving, becoming more encompassing, as we learn from our interaction with those others.
So the question that requires a satisfactory answer before we can accept Leopold’s second foundational claim is “How can the ecological community, or what Leopold speaks of as the ‘biotic community’, the community that includes ‘soils, water, plants, and animals’ be a genuine moral community?”  How can the interdependent parts of that collection of things communicate their needs relative to each other in ways that will make it possible for them to constitute, if not a moral republic, at least a moral polity of some functioning sort?  The answer is not an easy one.
The first thing to note is that the claims of various environmental philosophers to the effect that natural objects have intrinsic value or that we should treat nature with respect or with empathy are simply not very helpful.  Consider what it means to treat another with respect or empathy.  I suspect that it means something like treating the other as I would like to be treated in similar circumstances.  It is important to recognize that this cannot mean that I should treat the other as I would want to be treated if the other were like me.  That would involve the deep arrogance of failing to recognize that the other is, in fact, distinct from me, that the other has a unique history, unique connections to the things with which it relates, and thus is a neighbor of mine, not a clone of me.  Rather it must mean something more like that I should treat the other as I would want to be treated if I were in his or her circumstances.  Here, of course, we run up against James’ important caution about the frequent “falsity of our judgments, so far as they presume to decide in an absolute way on the value of other persons’ conditions or ideals.”  There is a real problem in my presumption to know what it is like to be in the other’s circumstances.  Given that our knowledge is a least largely based on experience, it is regularly much more particular in scope than we are inclined to think.  To some extent it is accurate to say that I know what it is like to be human, but that claim must surely be understood in the context of the fact that my experience of being human has been gained through the experience of a sixty-four year old, well educated, reasonably affluent, male American.  I simply do not know very much about what it’s like to be a young Indonesian woman living in a small village.  Much less, of course, do I know “What it’s Like to be a Bat,” or a dog, or a cow, or a coho salmon.  Even worse, it may not even make sense to talk about my knowing what it’s like to be a bacterium or a broccoli plant.
In the case of human communities we can see the central strength of James’ idea of the ethical republic.  While, as I have noted, I may not know much about what it’s like to be a young Indonesian woman, we can at least construct contexts in which it is possible for young Indonesian women to talk about what their lives are like.  Human history has shown that those in positions of power are often reluctant to listen to or to hear claims that threaten their power or privilege.  Nevertheless, the idea of the ethical republic raises a framework that shows conditions for moral community, at least in principle.
While the problem of communication would seem to make it impossible for any kind of ecological community containing “soils, water, plants, and animals” to constitute a Jamesian ethical republic, I think it is still possible for us to make sense of an ecological community of a somewhat morally less robust sort.  In the last part of this talk I want to present a sequence of communities or putative communities, starting with the full-blooded moral community that James speaks of as “the ethical republic,” and moving progressively through related moral communities in which communication is increasingly problematic.
An ethical republic is a community characterized by what many political philosophers speak of as “deliberative democracy.”  The principles governing the behavior of members of the ethical republic emerge as the members communicate with one another in richly varied ways.  Central to the richness of communication in an ethical republic is the level of communication that humans achieve through their use of language.  In an ethical republic we treat those around us as genuine ends, and not mere means, not because we have reflected on the desires of fully rational agents and reasoned to what principles such agents could will, but because we have listened to those other agents and have engaged them in deliberative processes to come to some mutual understanding of what we, as concrete and limitedly rational beings, in fact will.
There is surely some irony now in that I will reverse the procedure of Aristotle.  Rather than moving from the household to the polis, I move from the ethical republic to the ethical household.  My point, of course, is to move from a community of adult, functionally, albeit limitedly, rational and communicative human to a community of humans that includes infants and children.  All of us who have had the experience of raising children have occasionally experienced the unhappy baby.  The problem with the unhappy baby is that it is often difficult to determine what makes the baby unhappy.  Is the baby tired, and hence in need of a good nap?  Is the baby hungry?  Does the baby have some sort of pain that might indicate some illness or is it the routine pain that comes with new teeth cutting through the skin inside the mouth?  The baby is, of course, part of the family, part of a very important form of community.  We presume that the parents or caretakers of the baby are concerned for the welfare of the baby.  They want to do what will ease the baby’s distress.  But in order to know what to do they must determine what is causing the baby’s distress.  All those of us who have experienced unhappy babies know that this situation is not easy.  Yet we also know that it is not hopeless.  The baby’s inability to speak and tell us precisely what is bothering it makes it more difficult to determine what the baby’s needs are, but it does not make it impossible.  Essentially, in such situations, we experiment, with the experimentation informed by both our own experience and what we have learned from the experience of others.  We try various options that we think will ease the baby’s distress.  Quite commonly we succeed in fairly short order, and hit upon the right solution.  Sometimes we recognize that the baby’s distress is caused by something serious, but we find ourselves unable to determine the cause.  In such cases we frequently take the baby to be examined by a pediatrician whose special training carries with it an enhanced ability to determine the causes of the baby’s distress.  A note of caution is in order, however.  Quite commonly we succeed, but not always.  We have all heard of stories in which babies have died because those around it were not able to determine adequately and in time what it was that caused the baby’s distress.  Because the baby cannot tell us what is bothering it, the process of determining how to respond is more difficult, frequently more time consuming, and accordingly sometimes not successfully accomplished.  It is, in short, distinctly fallible.
My point in moving to the household community is to dislodge the hyper-rationalization of human communities that has been a feature of so much philosophy at least from Kant to Rawls.  No one seriously doubts that children and even infants are genuine members of our human communities.  At the same time, no one can seriously doubt that the ability of children and infants to participate in rationally deliberative elaborations and negotiations of their needs and interests is, in varying degrees, limited.  The ability of humans to participate in such elaborations develops from being virtually non-existent at birth to being quite well developed at some point in adulthood.  It is clearly not an “all or nothing” phenomenon.  The course of the development varies somewhat from individual to individual, yet follows fairly general patters studied by developmental psychologists.  For all that, they are members of our moral community from birth.
There is one other putative community that I want to consider before moving to the idea of an ecological community, the traditional farm.  The family community is now expanded to include animals and plants.  I don’t know how many of you have any experience with farming.  I spent most of the first twenty-two years of my life on the farm that is still my parents’ home.  We had horses, cattle, sometimes pigs and sheep, two dogs, and several cats.  We raised corn, oats, and hay.  Like babies, animals and plants lack language with which to explain the nature of their distress.  Like babies, even more than very young babies, animals do engage in rather complex forms of behavior that frequently provide significant information about the nature of their distress.  Plants present a more difficult case.
Certainly on a traditional farm there is a relationship of mutual dependence and interaction among the humans, the non-human animals, the plants, and even the soil on the farm.  Each provides food for the others.  Dogs provide help to the humans by herding cattle and chasing predators.  Cats hunt mice, rats, and other pests.  Like an unhappy baby, an animal experiencing distress has no language to communicate the problem.  Yet like babies, and often in even more sophisticated ways, animals clearly give certain behavioral indications that convey information about the sources of their distress.  Farmers who have substantial experience with animal behaviors can frequently gain useful information about the nature of distress.  Again, as with babies, there will be cases in which, even after some experimentation, the farmer either will not be able to determine the problem on the basis of animals’ behavior or will determine that the behavior indicates a problem that lies beyond the farmer’s ability to help mitigate the distress.  In such cases the farmer will regularly seek expert advice, frequently in the form of a veterinarian.  
The situation with plants is more difficult.  First, plants can manifest various signs that they are in distress, but they lack the behavioral capacities of animals.  Second, the resources from which the farmer can get expert advice in interpreting the signs of distress are not as powerful.  This, however, does not mean that there are no such resources.  While there are no “plant doctors,” in the sense in which veterinarians are “animal doctors,” most states in the United States have long provided what are called “County Agricultural Extension Agents.”  Virtually every state in the United States has a “land grant” university with a College of Agriculture and a department of something like Plant and Soil Sciences.  One of the historical and present purposes of these land grant universities has been to study the sciences that enable farmers to better understand problems they may encounter in the raising of livestock and crops.  The work done by researchers at the College of Agriculture is communicated to the broader community through a set of structures in which the County Agricultural Extension Agents serve as the central points of contact providing working farmers with access to the substantial bodies of horticultural and plant science research produced by the faculties of the land grant universities.  Thus a farmer may learn that the yellow pallor of young corn may be caused by poor drainage of the farmer’s field, or perhaps by an undesirable chemical composition of the soil.
This last possibility highlights the fact that one of the resources with which the farmer must work in the tending of plants is the soil.  Farmers cannot be successful without attending to the health of the soils on which they grow the various plants that they tend.  There is an intimate relationship between plants and soils.  One cannot simply plant a random plant in random soil and expect successful growth.  Soil must be of a suitable type, contain suitable nutrients, be situated so as to receive suitable drainage, etc., in order to grow particular plant life.  Accordingly, soil can fail to be “healthy” in a number of ways.  The experienced farmer has a fairly good level of experience-based understanding of healthy soil and of various conditions that we might speak of as distressed soils.  And again, the farmer has available expert resources on which to draw in determining the causes of soil distress that go beyond the competence of even the most experienced farmer.
The sequence of different kinds of communities or quasi-communities that I have just outlined provides a first step in addressing the question of how we can speak of an ecological community.  The farmer’s concern with the health of the “soil, water, plants, and animals” and the farmer’s attempts to act on that concern provides an entre to understanding the “biotic” community of which Aldo Leopold speaks.  Obviously the ecological community cannot be much like the robust “ethical republic” that constitutes the moral community of adult humans.  At the same time, the family, surely a form of human community, cannot be a robust “ethical republic” either.
A robust moral community, be it an ethical republic or a kingdom of ends, requires members who can make generally reliable, albeit fallible and corrigible, judgments about their own needs and interests.  The fundamental advantage of James’ “ethical republic” over Kant’s “kingdom of end” its more realistic acknowledgement of the fallibility of our judgments about the needs and interests of others and a more reliable framework within which our judgments about both our own and others needs and interests can be corrected.  The moment we introduce children, the reliability of whose judgments about their own needs and interests vary considerably over a course of cognitive development, and even more so infants, who lack the linguistic capacities to participate in the normal human processes of asserting and adjudicating needs and interests in community settings, we have been forced to adopt a more modest and nuanced model of moral community.
If we accept, as we surely must, that the collectivity of humans constitutes a genuine moral community, and we accept something like the account that I have given above about how human communities incorporate the needs and interests of infants and children into the process of framing collective judgments about how we are to live together in a way that pays due heed to the needs and interests of the full membership of the human community, we are well on the way to giving a plausible version of a “land ethic.”
The two foundational claims on which Leopold rests his advocacy of a land ethic are 1) that ethics rests upon the premise that the individuals are members of a communities of interdependent parts, and 2) that we humans live in a community of interdependent parts that “include[s] soils, water, plants, and animals, or collectively: the land.”  I have, I believe, established that community, in the morally relevant sense, does not require either full rationality or full communicative ability.  The move from the human community to a biotic community, then, requires that we recognize a complex system of mutually interdependent parts that includes “soils, water, plants, and animals,” and that we be able to give an account of how we can frame generally reliable, albeit fallible and corrigible, judgments about the needs and interests of the non-human parts of such a system.
I have looked at the traditional farm as a kind of intermediary between the family and the putative biotic community.  The farm cannot constitute robust ethical republics because of the limits constraining exchange of information and exchange of needs among its parts.  The even-more severe limits constraining exchange of information and exchange of needs among the members of the biotic community likewise prevent its moral character from being robustly democratic.  Yet our increasing knowledge of our larger physical environment has made it quite clear that humans do live on this planet within a system of interdependent parts that includes soils, water, plants, and animals.  And humans do have resources through which we can learn a considerable amount about the well-being of that system of interdependent parts.  As I have noted, those resources do not give us the depth or the richness of information that we gain through communication in the full-fledged ethical republic of human adults.  Nevertheless the information is considerable.
The key, I think, to the parent’s regular success in gaining information about the well-being of the unhappy child and the farmer’s regular success in gaining information about the well-being of the soils, water, plants, and animals that comprise the farm community is interest, another notion to which James devoted considerable attention.  Parents are drawn, I take it, by love to take a passionate interest in the well-being of their children, unhappy babies included.  Farmers are drawn to a strong interest in the well-being of the soils, water, plants, and animals that make up the farm because they recognize the mutual interdependence of all of the parts that are required for farming to function.  The first condition that is required for humans to understand themselves as members of an ecological or biotic community is likewise interest.  One of the challenges of the contemporary world is urbanization.  People living in cities are significantly removed from the natural processes that constitute our biotic environment.  As a result, it becomes easy for people to ignore the well-being of the interdependent parts of that system, and even their interdependence itself, in a way in which it would not be possible for a farmer to ignore the well-being of the soils, water, plants, and animals that interact on the farm every day.  I take it that an important part of the motivation for UNESCO’s declaration of a Decade of Education for Sustainable Development has been the recognition of the need to use the resources of education to promote such interest.  Undoubtedly we must not be overly idealistic about the extent to which even the best environmental education can generate interest in the well-being of the biotic community.  Nevertheless, it would seem that education is really the only resource we have in a world where large numbers of people lack significant experience of their interdependency with the other parts of the biotic community.
The second condition necessary for humans to be positively contributing members of an ecological community follows from the first.  Both parents and farmers are strongly motivated to seek and usually heed the advice of people with expert knowledge concerning appropriate aspects of the well-being of babies, on the one hand, and soils, water, plants, and animals, on the other.  An audience like this one knows well that universities train, in addition to philosophers, pediatricians, veterinarians, and horticulturalists, people who acquire expert knowledge on various aspects of the system of interdependent parts that constitutes our environment.  Clearly in the United States, and I suspect most other places as well, there are demagogic politicians who tell people that popular or profitable ideas concerning our physical environment have nothing to learn from the work of environmental scientists.  Part of our job, both as citizens and as teachers, is to help our communities fully realize that we ignore the results of environmental science at great peril, just as we ignore the advice of pediatricians and veterinarians only at the peril of our children and our farms. 
I conclude then that living together in an ecological community is a challenging possibility, but a possibility nonetheless.  It requires recognition that an ecological community must be something more modest than a full-blown moral community, a polity less robust than the ethical republic.  The chief requirements of this polity are a genuine interest in the role of those parts that lack robust means of communication with us, and a willingness to acknowledge the superior, albeit always fallible and corrigible, knowledge of the scientists who claim some sort of expertise concerning the working of those parts.  These conditions both present serious challenges.  Neither can be met easily.  Even in the best of circumstances, neither can be met adequately.  Those facts, however, do not mean that we cannot make significant progress.  Just as the ethical republic is an ongoing project, never getting it fully right, but hopefully making slow and steady improvement, so we have some reason to hope that living together in a biotic or environmental community may likewise be an ongoing project at which we may make slow but steady improvement.  In both cases the cost of failure to make such improvement is seriously threatening to our ability to live decent human lives.
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